How would Chat Control scan messages?
By comparing images with fingerprints of known abuse material, and by using software that flags likely new material or grooming. On encrypted apps, that check would have to run on the phone itself.1, 2, 5
Checked 29 October 2026 against the sources.
Three things a scanner can look for
The Commission's 2022 proposal let detection orders cover known material, new material and grooming.1 Each needs a different technique.
| Target | Technique | How it works |
|---|---|---|
| Known material | Hash matching | An image or video is turned into a short digital signature, a "hash", and compared with a database of hashes of verified abuse material.2 |
| New material | Classifiers | Software that estimates whether material not seen before is likely to be abuse material, instead of matching a known fingerprint. The temporary rules describe classifiers and artificial intelligence in use today.2 |
| Grooming | Text analysis | Software that looks for patterns in conversations. Under the current temporary rules it must rely on key indicators and risk factors "such as age difference".3 |
Under the 2022 proposal, providers could only detect using indicators verified and supplied by a new EU Centre.1
Where the scanning happens
On an ordinary service, the server can read messages, so it can scan them there. With end-to-end encryption it cannot, so the only place left is the device.
The two sides of the technical argument
Both sides agree on how the pieces work. They disagree on what the scanning costs and what it achieves.
The case that it can be done safely
The 2022 proposal required detection technology to be effective, unable to extract any other information than needed, the least intrusive available and "sufficiently reliable".4 It called end-to-end encryption "an important tool" and said the law should not favor or disfavor any technology.4
The EU Centre would check providers' reports before passing them to police, to limit errors.1
The case that it cannot
The EU's data protection authorities said orders could in practice amount to "general and indiscriminate" monitoring, and that detection, including client-side scanning, could be evaded by encrypting content with a separate app.5
A 2021 paper by 14 security researchers argues that client-side scanning "neither guarantees efficacious crime prevention nor prevents surveillance".6
What each text says about encryption
| Text | Ordered scanning | End-to-end encryption |
|---|---|---|
| Commission proposalMay 2022 | Yes, by detection order | No exception: orders apply "regardless of the technologies used".4 |
| Parliament positionNovember 2023 | Yes, as a last resort | Excluded from detection orders.7 |
| Council mandateNovember 2025 | No; voluntary scanning made permanent, with a review clause8 | In September 2026 the presidency said encrypted content would be excluded from searches.9 |
| Temporary rulesRegulation 2026/1881 | No, voluntary only | Do not apply to communications to which end-to-end encryption "is, has been or will be applied".3 |
Voice and email
Voice
Negotiators provisionally agreed in June 2026 to leave voice calls out of the permanent law, and to keep voice messages in scope but out of detection.10 The temporary rules do not apply to the scanning of audio at all.3
The temporary rules name webmail alongside messaging as the kind of service that scans voluntarily.2 Email that is not end-to-end encrypted can be scanned on the provider's servers. How to protect your messages
This page explains technology and draft law. It is not legal advice.
Sources 10
- Summary of the legislative proposal COM(2022) 209, European Parliament Legislative Observatory. Read 29 October 2026.
- PE-CONS 14/1/26 REV 1, Regulation (EU) 2026/1881, recital 7, European Parliament and Council. Read 29 October 2026.
- PE-CONS 14/1/26 REV 1, Regulation (EU) 2026/1881, Articles 1 and 3, European Parliament and Council. Read 29 October 2026.
- 9068/22, the Commission's proposal COM(2022) 209, recital 26 and Article 10(3), Council of the EU. Read 29 October 2026.
- EDPB-EDPS Joint Opinion 04/2022, paragraphs 45 and 53, European Data Protection Board and European Data Protection Supervisor. Read 29 October 2026.
- Bugs in our Pockets: The Risks of Client-Side Scanning, 14 October 2021, Abelson and others, arXiv. Read 29 October 2026.
- Summary of the LIBE committee report A9-0364/2023, European Parliament Legislative Observatory. Read 29 October 2026.
- 14032/25, Presidency note on a partial mandate, 30 October 2025, Council of the EU. Read 29 October 2026.
- WK 15082/2026, outcome of the 6th trilogue, 30 September 2026, Council of the EU. Read 29 October 2026.
- 11501/26, outcome of the trilogue on 29 June 2026, Council of the EU. Read 29 October 2026.
Every fact here comes from the legal texts, the EU's own records or named research, checked again and dated. How we check